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Financial market depth: friend or foe  
when it comes to effective management  
of monetary policy and capital flows? 
Sukudhew Singh
1 
In advice given to emerging market economies (EMEs), it is often emphasised that having 
developed financial markets would both enable them to manage capital flows more 
efficiently, thereby reducing the need to intervene in the foreign exchange markets, and allow 
for more effective monetary policy. But despite their evident benefits, it is also the case that 
developed financial markets can complicate the management of monetary policy and capital 
flows. This note examines both sides of the argument, but with a greater emphasis on the 
issues that highly developed financial markets can create for policymakers.  
Here is a brief summary of some of the key points from both sides of the issue: 
Friend – Ways in which developed financial markets help policymakers  
1.  Deeper financial markets can more readily absorb flows. Financial markets in EMEs 
are dominated by the banking system. Hence, liquidity tends to accumulate in the 
banking system. With more developed capital markets, the liquidity inflows tend to 
be more spread out across the financial system. 
2.  A deep financial system can more effectively utilise the liquidity in a non-wasteful 
and non-distortionary manner.  
3.  Developed financial markets give the central bank a broader range of tools to 
manage monetary policy. 
4.  The greater variety of saving and borrowing instruments makes it easier for the 
central bank to change interest rates to manage monetary policy, unlike where, for 
example, savings are predominantly in the form of deposits with banks. 
Foe – How developed financial markets hamper effective policy 
1.  Deeper financial markets attract more capital inflows, due to the availability of more 
assets and market liquidity to support speculative activity. 
2.  As the recent crisis highlights, deeper financial markets are not immune to 
excesses. In fact, deep financial markets may channel liquidity into riskier but more 
opaque activity that may not be noticed by regulators. 
3.  Developed financial markets do not solve the problem of asset price bubbles. 
4.  The monetary policy transmission mechanism may be more complicated – a lack of 
understanding can lead to policy errors.  
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5.  Increased innovation (correlated with market depth) can lead to some market activity 
being outside the regulatory view, with implications for crisis prevention and 
management. 
6.  Increased liberalisation (also correlated with market depth) can increase the impact 
of global disturbances on the domestic financial system, hence disrupting the 
conduct of monetary policy. 
7.  Large financial systems with large flows may require the central bank to hold larger 
reserves than it otherwise would in order to smooth market volatility.  
The rest of this paper looks at the recent experience of four Asian economies that have 
relatively well developed financial markets, starting with Malaysia and Korea and then 
moving on to Hong Kong SAR and Singapore. 
Malaysia 
After the Asian financial crisis highlighted the concentration of risks in a bank-based financial 
system, efforts were undertaken to accelerate the development of the capital markets, 
particularly the bond market. Because of these measures, the size and depth of the bond 
market in Malaysia increased significantly, propelling it to become the third largest in Asia as 
a percentage of GDP. Meanwhile, the equity market also remains sizeable with an annual 
turnover in US dollar terms of USD 169.7 billion in 2007. Liberalisation of foreign exchange 
rules has led to increased foreign participation in the equity and bond markets. 
Consequently, there has been increased volatility in the equity, bond and foreign exchange 
markets as portfolio flows increase the linkage between these markets and changes in global 
conditions.  
In terms of monetary policy and the management of capital flows, the increased depth of the 
financial markets provides a number of benefits. The development of the bond market has 
not only served to diversify the sources of financing to the economy, but has also enhanced 
the overall stability of financial prices by allowing the flows to be dispersed across a wider 
range of assets. As a result, the distribution of capital inflows among financial assets in 
Malaysia had become more balanced by 2008, compared to the 1990s.  
Second, the deepening of the money markets has made available more tools for BNM to 
manage liquidity. Traditional liquidity management instruments such as direct borrowing and 
reserve requirements are complemented by the use of repo operations, foreign exchange 
swaps and the issuance of BNM bills. Third, empirical evidence indicates that the 
development of financial markets has generally led to a stronger monetary policy pass-
through in terms of faster and larger adjustments of retail rates in response to changes in the 
policy rate. 
In the current circumstances of large capital flows to emerging markets, the fact that, to date, 
Malaysia has not found it necessary to impose measures to manage these inflows is 
evidence that the deeper financial system is making their management easier. It has 
effectively raised Malaysia’s threshold of tolerance compared to the pre-Asian financial crisis 
period. However, it is important to note that while the threshold has been raised, it has not 
been eliminated. Sustained large inflows could still overwhelm the absorptive capacity of the 
financial system and the ability of policymakers to manage them. 





Therefore, deep financial markets are not a panacea when it comes to sustained large 
capital inflows. They have also posed challenges to the conduct of monetary policy and the 
management of capital flows. First, the magnitude and volatility of portfolio flows have placed 
considerable two-way pressure on the exchange rate that can potentially be disruptive for 
international trade and investment activity. Second, the management of sustained large 
capital inflows can potentially pose risks to central bank balance sheets, for instance when 
foreign investors hold large amounts of central bank bills issued to sterilise liquidity – this 
could potentially expose the central bank to risks arising from interest rate differentials and 
exchange rate fluctuations.  
Third, large capital flows have also hampered the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
In 2005, BNM raised interest rates by 80 basis points to normalise monetary conditions. 
Yields on three- to 10-year government bonds, however, declined by 79–91 basis points 
between June 2006 and December 2007, as foreign interest in these bonds increased 
substantially.  
Fourth, the significant foreign participation and strong linkages with global financial markets 
have also increased the contagion of global shocks to the domestic financial system. For 
example, during the subprime crisis in 2008, Malaysia experienced large portfolio outflows as 
foreign investors liquidated their holdings of Malaysian assets in response to the financial 
distress in their home markets. This caused the KLCI index to retreat by 39.3% during the 
year. The fall in equity prices had negative wealth effects on domestic consumption. 
Korea 
Following the deregulation and liberalisation of the Korean financial system in the 1990s, the 
depth of the Korean capital and foreign exchange markets, as well as the banking system, 
increased significantly. The liberalisation also led to rising foreign participation in the Korean 
financial system. Its bond market is now the second largest in Asia after Japan, while its 
equity market capitalisation is now seven times higher than in 1998. The average turnover in 
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markets, the banking sector also became deeper and was transformed, especially in terms of 
a liability base that was increasingly characterised by non-deposit liabilities, with the average 
loan-to-deposit ratio exceeding 100%. Following several liberalisation measures, many 
foreign banks opened branches in the country. These banks rely mainly on foreign currency 
funding. This, together with the hedging activities of the shipbuilding industry, has added to 
the high short-term external debt of the economy.  
In terms of monetary policy and the management of capital flows, the increasing depth and 
sophistication of the financial markets have posed several challenges. Firstly, the large 
portfolio inflows during 2001–07 caused persistent appreciation pressure on the Korean won, 
a significant expansion of household credit and a steep run-up in housing prices. They also 
posed risks to the central bank’s balance sheet. The large issuance of Monetary Stability 
Bonds (MSBs) for sterilised intervention purposes resulted in the debt structure of the Bank 
of Korea (BoK) being concentrated on foreign assets and MSBs, which exposed the BoK’s 
balance sheet to interest rate and exchange rate risk. The accounts of the BoK turned into 
deficit from 2004–07 when the won appreciated persistently. 
Large portfolio flows have also hampered the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. 
Responding to the increase in liquidity, the BoK raised its policy rate several times between 
October 2005 and August 2008. Large inflows of foreign bond investments exerted 
downward pressure on long-term market interest rates, thus limiting the transmission of the 
upward adjustment in the policy rate.  
Financial market developments have also sometimes worked against policymakers’ efforts to 
manage capital inflows. This is especially the case with the development of financial 
derivatives such as foreign exchange swap contracts and currency swaps. For example, in 
2006, the government introduced policies to promote capital outflows, making it much easier 
for Korean residents to invest abroad. While residents’ overseas portfolio and direct 
investment soared in response, overseas foreign currency borrowings also increased as 
investors sold forward exchange on a large scale to hedge against exchange rate risk. 
Therefore, measures aimed at promoting capital outflows had the unexpected consequence 
of increasing capital inflows. 
Significant foreign participation and high linkages with the global financial markets have also 
heightened volatility in the domestic financial markets. The relatively high reliance of Korean 
banks on wholesale funding and the high external debt have proved to be a source of 
instability, negatively affecting investor confidence even when other economic fundamentals 
were strong. After Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September 2008, Korea experienced a 
haemorrhage of foreign capital outflows, due to a rapid increase in repayments of external 
borrowings and the sell-off in the equity market. The rollover ratio of banks’ external 
borrowings declined sharply to less than 30% at one point, and the won/dollar exchange rate 
and CDS (credit default swap) premium surged. In order to ease the foreign liquidity 
squeeze, the BoK supplied a total of USD 26.6 billion in foreign currency liquidity through its 
Competitive Auction Swap Facility using official foreign reserves, and through its Competitive 
Auction Loan Facility using proceeds of its currency swaps with the US Federal Reserve. 
The Korean government also guaranteed payment for the banking sector’s external debt due 
until end-June 2009. To strengthen the backstop in mitigating the risk of the global financial 
market turmoil, the BoK then established a USD 30 billion swap arrangement with the Fed, 
the People’s Bank of China and the Bank of Japan. 
The deep financial system in Korea has not ameliorated the need for government 
intervention to mitigate risks, especially those related to the external sector. For instance, 
over the last two years, several macroprudential measures have been introduced to manage 
capital flows and the consequent risks. These include limiting the banks’ derivative positions, 
a tax of as much as 14% on interest income from treasury and central bank bonds and a 
20% levy on capital gains from the sale of these bonds, while a levy on foreign currency 
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Hong Kong SAR 
Hong Kong SAR is an international financial centre and its monetary regime is a currency 
board.
2  Its deep financial markets have allowed Hong Kong to intermediate large amounts of 
liquidity and have, to some extent, compensated for the lack of monetary tools to manage 
excessive monetary growth. Nevertheless, Hong Kong’s deep markets have not shielded the 
economy from the vagaries of capital flows and its limited monetary flexibility. During the 
Asian financial crisis, it became the target of speculative attacks on its currency and equity 
markets. From January to August 1998, speculators accumulated Hong Kong dollars (HKD) 
by swapping US dollar (USD) bonds for HKD. At the same time, speculators were also 
accumulating large short positions in the stock index futures market while waiting for the right 
moment to dump their large amounts of accumulated HKD. In accordance with currency 
board discipline, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) had initially intervened by 
passively buying HKD to ease pressure on the currency. However, this caused liquidity in the 
HKD interbank market to shrink, which sent interbank rates skyrocketing as high as 19%. 
The effects of the extremely high interbank rates were immediately transmitted to the Hang 
Seng Index, which dropped to its lowest level of 6660. In an unprecedented move, the HKMA 
was forced to intervene in the stock market by purchasing USD 15 billion worth of constituent 
stocks to stabilise the market. 
Hong Kong has also not been spared from risks arising from external financial contagion. In 
the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse, the liquidity squeeze in the USD interbank 
market spread quickly to the HKD money market as investors sought to borrow HKD and 
actively convert them to USD through foreign exchange swaps. The three month Hibor-OIS
3 
spread, used here as an indicator of interbank stress, increased to 250 basis points in an 
environment of heightened credit risk uncertainties and the desire to preserve liquidity for 
contingency purposes. As a result, HKD interbank rates increased significantly in tandem 
with their USD counterparts. At the same time, there was also appreciation pressure on the 
HKD as investors unwound their earlier HKD-funded carry trade positions.  
Singapore 
While Singapore is an international financial centre similar to Hong Kong, the state of 
openness poses less of a risk to Singapore. First, being a financial centre, Singapore acts as 
an intermediary for global funds whose ultimate destinations are countries in the region. 
Therefore, while these funds come into Singapore, they do not stay there – a large portion 
ultimately flows out again. Second, the government and the private sector in Singapore have 
regularly undertaken large investments abroad, resulting in net portfolio outflows. Hence, 
capital flows have probably been less of a complication for policymaking in Singapore than 
they have been in other regional countries.  
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Secondly, in contrast to Hong Kong, Singapore’s monetary policy is based on an exchange 
rate targeting regime, which is managed with reference to a trade-weighted index. The width 
and slope of the target band are adjusted in response to changes in economic fundamentals 
and desired policy objectives. This feature combined with the large foreign exchange 
reserves of the Singapore authorities provides a strong defence against currency 
speculation. In addition, to facilitate better domestic monetary control, Singapore has 
imposed some restrictions on the international use of the domestic currency. Only domestic 
banking units are allowed to undertake transactions in Singapore dollars (SGD). The Asian 
Currency Units,
4 on the other hand, deal with any currency except the SGD. Singapore also 
used to have the non-internationalisation policy that protected the SGD from speculative 
attacks and facilitated the effective conduct of monetary policy. The policy was progressively 
relaxed after the Asian financial crisis to develop the bond market.
5 
Despite its status as a financial centre, Singapore’s financial system has not been able to 
absorb the surplus liquidity created by its monetary regime. As in the case of Hong Kong, the 
limited availability of land in Singapore has made property investments the primary target of 
domestic and international speculative flows. Also like Hong Kong, lacking the normal 
monetary policy tools, Singapore has relied almost exclusively on macroprudential measures 
to manage the build-up of property price bubbles and to mitigate excessive bank lending for 
risky ventures. In addition, the fiscal surpluses of the government, the positive net 
contributions to the Central Provident Fund and the external investments of the Singapore 
sovereign wealth funds have proved to be important in draining some of the surplus liquidity 
out of the domestic financial system.  
Conclusion 
The point here is not that having deep financial markets is not useful. Rather, it is that they 
are not the remedy that they are made out to be when it comes to managing capital flows 
and maintaining the independent conduct of monetary policy. Furthermore, deep financial 
markets come with their own set of problems and vulnerabilities. With respect to capital 
flows, deeper financial markets create higher thresholds for absorptive capacity and 
tolerance of capital inflows, but there are nevertheless thresholds of tolerance. This issue will 
become increasingly important if the current divergence in growth between EMEs and the 
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advanced economies proves to be a long-term trend and the flows of capital into EMEs 
become more permanent and sustained. 
In such circumstances, even the deeper financial markets of some EMEs may prove to be 
inadequate, and policymakers – aside from contemplating measures to directly manage the 
large capital inflows – also need to start thinking about how to increase the resilience of their 
financial systems in the face of these inflows and minimise the consequent economic 
distortions. Would limiting financial innovation – that is, giving up some market depth for 
market stability – be a useful option? Would building more sophisticated information systems 
and greater regulatory oversight be a useful accompaniment to the increased liberalisation 
and depth of markets, and if so, how should we go about putting them in place and how 
should we assess their effectiveness? 